Those aspects that constitute the self have been compared and contrasted by Sartre and Beauvoir as facticity and transcendence, the in-itself and the for-itself. Their discussions explore the relationships of the self and the self with others. Both philosophers can agree that facticity, the in-itself, refers to one’s condition of body and role within society. It represents the past or one’s history. It refers to an object or thing, and has the quality of immanence. Transcendence falls upon the opposite end of the spectrum. This for-itself represents freedom and change. It is that which is not fixed, and is often described as one’s thinking. Sartre and Beauvior can agree that facticity and transcendence create the human experience, yet as men and women have a tendency to disagree, their assumptions conclude the experiences of facticity and transcendence are gender specific.
Sartre’s Views:
Sartre was the first to claim that facticity is in-itself and transcendence for-itself. These two parts exist as the human experience in a duality which makes man a being that is both what is and is not. He claims that human reality is “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is,” (100). Humans are born into the world with certain attributes; however, these are not always concrete and are subject to environmental influence and self-motivation. Within the individual resides the potential to be and not be whatever is described as its facticity, and the ability to surpass factical limitations via transcendence. This dualistic theme reoccurs within the human experience, as one cannot exist without an opposite to compare itself to.
The discussion will begin with Sartre’s views of facticity before transitioning to his views on transcendence, and will end with Beauvoir’s views. According to Sartre, part of the human experience is learning to live with the cards one has been dealt. “Facticity is not a choice,” (131-132). Forces outside of the self initially determine our body and condition and continue to exert influence over time. One does not have complete control over the self, as there are infinite influences determining our initial condition upon entry of this existence and continue to condition our factical nature throughout life. More simply, if a man is born without an arm, he has to learn to just deal with it because he will never be a person born with an arm.
If facticity is used to describe the body, then Sartre believes that we can never relate directly to it. Instead, humans rely on the interpretations of others when forming ideas about themselves. “In fact, the body which I have just described is not my body such as it is for me… the body which I myself do not know,” (401). In this paragraph he discusses the relationship that is developed through interaction with cadavers, physicians, and surgeons. He claims that we can never truly know our own body. Our concept of our own facticity is generated by the concepts imposed upon us or through our learning experiences. Sartre’s example of the cadaver is a great example of this point. He describes how we cannot know what our own organs look like; we must rely on the assumption that our organs are the same as the organs seen in others, such as what is seen when watching an autopsy. But even then, we can only begin to guess our individual differences because we can never have a direct experience with our own facticity.
Although external forces largely determine part of the self, it is balanced by our capacity to make choices. The human body is only part of a greater whole constituting the self. On page 132, Sartre says, “(Facticity) is only partially what we are.” The other side to this coin is transcendence. We can alter our facticity given the nature of transcendence so far as the nature of our facticity would limit us. But how does transcendence work? “Transcendence is nihilation of in-itself,” claims Sartre (134). In order to transcend one’s current facitity or overcome a perceived physical obstacle, one must destroy the old concept of objective condition through change. An aspect of the factical self has to be determined to no longer be of service to the higher self so that one might deny having any imposed limitations in exchange for acting freely. Change occurs through opposite action, and having the capacity to make the choice to change is the nature of transcendence.
This concept of transcendence is more complicated than facticity. The in-itself is concrete, but the for-itself encompasses potential on a spectrum ranging from absolute to nothing. Transcendence, as described by Sartre, is the foundation of its own nothingness, (239). Early in the text, he uses an example of a waiter, who in being a waiter, also has to not be a waiter in that he is also a man, perhaps a father, a son, and so forth. Being a waiter is a task or duty, defining the role in which the man plays, but it is not a concrete feature of his self. Facticity on the opposite hand is characterized by concreteness. “Only the for-itself can be determined in its being by a being in which it is not,” (244). Facticity is a given whereas transcendence is more complex. Yet, transcendence exists in that it is bonded to facticity, as facticity is not transcendence and transcendence is what it is not.
Knowledge generates awareness of facticity and transcendence and is a platform in which the two interact. For-itself and in-itself relate through knowledge, as they are two halves of the same whole. “The for-itself is outside itself in the in-itself since it causes itself to be defined by what it is not; the first bond between the in-itself and the for-itself is therefore a bond of being,” (245). This bond is recognized through knowledge generated by learning experiences. The level of knowledge coincides with the capacity of the individual to change. Just as this dualistic statement suggests, one cannot exist without the other so that they may find balance through knowledge.
Beauvior’s Views:
Beauvoir recognizes Sartre’s definitions of facticity and transcendence, but believes that women experience them differently than men. Men are to women as facticity is to transcendence. They must relate to each other in order to exist while recognizing that they exist separate from each other. A difference exists between men and women in how they express or relate to facticity and transcendence, though they experience both simultaneously. Men see men as X, self, and women as O, other, whereas women see men as X and women as XO. “In reality, the struggle between them cannot be clear cut, since a woman’s very being is opacity; she does not stand in front of man as a subject but as an object paradoxically endowed with subjecticity; she assumes herself as both self and other which is a contradiction with disconcerting consequences,” (755). A man does not assume himself to be other, he is only self; however, the specific role of women within society (specifically the context in which women bear children) creates a barrier limiting women from being fully for-themselves. It seems as though the role of women is to be immanently of services to others, which is different than men who strive for the best of themselves.
The consequences of this contradictory experience of women lend itself to the idea that Beauvoir believes women experience facticity and transcendence differently than men. Women’s very relation to either is, in the long run, determined by her interactions with men. “The woman confined to immanence tries to keep man in this prison as well,” (754). She knows nothing but her limitations and is ignorant of her capacity to change; therefore, she projects her experience onto others in an attempt to find relativity. These limitations were imposed on her in some older civilizations, giving her no room to seek change or transcendence. She was treated as an object, and as Sartre has shown us, we relate to our own facticity by other’s interpretations. With the change in modern ideologies pertaining to feminist rights, women have been entrusted with independence. This has completely altered the way women perceive themselves. “Woman no longer seeks to drag (man) into the realms of immanence but to emerge into the light of transcendence,” (754). Knowledge has provided room for women to overcome some of their factical limitations and strive for transcendence as does man. The focus of their dependence upon men has shifted so she no longer tries to make herself relate to him, but rather finds expression in which he must relate to her.
As women’s roles have begun to change, men, too, have also had to shift their views of what it means to be human. Their relationship is no longer that of servant and master, but rather it is a relationship striving for equality. “Man, though when he treats her like a freedom , is indignant that she is still a trap for him; while he flatters and satisfies her in her role as his prey, he gets annoyed at her claims to autonomy; whatever he does, he feels duped and she feels wronged,” (755). There exists within this dual nature a competition for dominance. In a perfect world, there would be equal balance between two opposing forces, but because the world is constantly changing and developing, one force must always create an impact on the other. As the roles of facticity and transcendence change, so do the roles of men of women.
Sartre and Beauvoir can both agree that unity arises from opposition, but these opposing factors are a driving force wherein they both try to fight for the same level of control. Beauvoir states, “Two transcendences confront each other; instead of mutually recognizing each other, each freedom wants to dominate the other,” (754). This implies that freedom of the self comes from denying freedom of another. Sartre can agree with Beauvoir in that duality exists so that one can exist as recognition of the other. The mind must exist within a body, and a body, when described as human, occurs with thought and subjective relation to the environment and others. Thus, immanence and transcendence occur at the same time (B, 443), constantly exerting an unbalanced influence over each other.
Facticity is in-itself and transcendence is for-itself, and as Sartre and Beauvior argue, they occur at the same time as the self. Both can also agree that men and women both experience facticity and transcendence; however, Beauvior elaborates on the specificities of experiencing both from the feminine standpoint. Women have different facticities than men, yet they both have a mind which links their transcendence through knowledge. Men and women can both account for weakness and strength having influence over the capacity to transcend. Beauvoir also notes how societal definitions change as well as how individuals perceive (46). Perceptions of facticity and transcendence depend on economic and social situations; the aspects of facticity determine limits of men and women as society dictates their specific roles determined by culture. This lends to the notion that “we” decide, not “I” decide, the self. Our role within society determines the impact of transcendence on facticity. Therefore, facticity and transcendence are specific to gender.
